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 Observations from Mandatory Livestock Price Reporting 
for Analysts and Researchers 
 
 
Mandatory livestock price reporting has changed how prices are reported and used.  
Reporting has affected the availability of many reports and has added new reports and 
information.  A variety of research issues are facilitated by the scope of new information 
available.  However, the new information often needs to be put into a meaningful form for direct 
use.  A brief overview of the evolution and implementation of mandatory price reporting is given.  
The new price reports are then discussed and compared to voluntary reports.  There is enough 
new information that analysts may be able to make different insights into price formation.  
Special attention is given to new reports that give insights into the short-run cattle supply 
situation.  While the focus is on cattle reports, swine reports are also briefly discussed. 
 
As fundamental business practices have changed in the beef industry in recent years, 
price transparency has come into question.  Changing business practices imply different price 
information may also be necessary for market participants to make informed business decisions.  
Before mandatory reporting, producers argued they were not able to quickly and easily obtain 
information to determine the best possible price for their product.  State legislatures responded 
by passing mandatory reporting laws, requiring packers sourcing livestock in the respective 
states to make more market information accessible. 
Passage of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 usurped various regulations 
requiring packers to report transactions to state authorities.  Under the national law, large packers 
of cattle, swine, and sheep must report data from purchases and processing with respect to price, 
volume, and grade.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS) is responsible for assembling and disseminating the reports. 
The relevancy of information provided under national mandatory price reporting has not 
been assessed at this time.  There has been adoption of different prices, for example by the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  However, methods of disseminating the abundance of new 
information in an understandable manner need to be examined.  With any new information 
  2system there is also a concern over its internal consistency.  Quite simply, will the numbers add 
up in a meaningful way and be reliable enough to improve decision-making?  Following the 
initial implementation, there have been changes in what and how information is delivered.  There 
is now a brief data history available, making comparisons to year ago levels possible.   
The purpose of this paper is to distill the information available under national mandatory 
livestock price reporting.  The focus will be primarily on cattle prices, with some comparisons to 
swine reporting.  An overview of the current breadth of reports follows with particular attention 
given to formula and forward contract prices.  The committed and delivered and packer owned 
reports are then covered in detail as they provide a significant amount of new, non-price 
information that should be useful for gauging short- and medium-term supply situations.  The 
paper concludes with implications for analysts and researchers working in this area. 
 
Background 
Fundamental changes in the beef industry are: a concentration of buyers and sellers of 
finished livestock, an increased number of alliances, a lessened reliance on cash markets 
(specifically auction markets), a shortened trading window for slaughter transactions, and an 
increased use of value-based pricing (GIPSA, 2001).  The result of these changes has been a 
reduced number of transactions covered by traditional voluntary price reporting.  While reduced 
transparency does not have to imply reduced pricing efficiency, it does call into question the 
timeliness and applicability of reported prices. 
Haley (2001) provides a brief overview of the legislation and early implementation 
problems of mandatory price reporting.  One such problem was a meat price reporting error that 
potentially distorted cattle prices (LMPR Review Team, 2001).  A possible contributing factor 
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confidentiality was maintained, that limited a broad scope of prices from being reported.  
Analysts may have been able to catch the reporting error sooner with a full array of prices.  AMS 
now uses a “3/70/20” guideline, for details see Haley (2001), and there is now much broader 
reporting. 
The national law has resulted in the loss of some state-level market information.  
National reporting eliminated many state-specific reports released by AMS.  For many states not 
included in the current regional or state-specific reports, uncertainty now exists as to the relevant 
price for decision-making, even when they have auction markets.  Auction summaries and direct 
feeder cattle reports were unaffected by the switch to mandatory reporting.  Cattle feeders, 
packers, and the rest of the industry used these reports for decision-making and had to look to 
other sources for bid and ask information, which led to some concerns about the unbiased nature 
of the sources.  AMS recently resumed voluntary reporting of prices on a limited basis, but not 
for any of the areas that lost direct reports. 
Schroeder et al. (2002) find similar sentiments about the performance of mandatory 
reporting in a survey of cattle feeders.  The perception was neutral to negative regarding the net 
benefits of having mandatory reporting.  Of particular note are the results that reporting is now 
considered less timely and that no additional price information is available.  Further, feeders 
sensed no increase in their ability to negotiate with packers.  While this should not be viewed as 
a condemning feature of the legislation, it captures the frustration in negotiating prices in the 
current environment. 
Wachenheim and DeVuyst (2001) assess the potential for collusive packer behavior 
under national mandatory price reporting.  They present multiple arguments both for and against 
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significant factor.  Similarly, Azzam (2003) develops a model that combines price information 
across packers and finds that mandatory reporting may reduce the cost of price uncertainty.  The 
potential result is a reduced cost for packers and potentially an increase in demand for cattle. 
 
Price Information 
The switch from voluntary to mandatory reporting has had direct and indirect 
consequences on price information.  While only a portion of the reports are highlighted here, a 
list of all reports under mandatory price reporting can be accessed at the AMS website, 
www.ams.usda.gov.  AMS and the industry use inconsistent naming conventions for various 
reports.  Thus when clarity is necessary the number of specific reports, such as LM_CT154, will 
be given. 
For slaughter cattle prices at the national level, AMS reports information monthly, 
weekly, and multiple times daily.   Direct slaughter cattle purchases by packers are broken down 
into negotiated, formulated, and forward contract reports.  Regional prices are available for 
Texas-Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Iowa-Minnesota to varying degrees.  These 
states comprise the 5-Area reports.  Cow and bull price reports are available at the national level.  
A weekly report of premiums and discounts rounds out the price reports. 
The negotiated purchases report, LM_CT154, covers slaughtered animals that were 
purchased using a negotiated price.  Included is the number of head, dressing percentage, weight 
range, weighted average weight, price range and a weighted average price.  A new feature is the 
additional breakdown of non-negotiated purchases, such as in LM_CT151.  Thus, prices in these 
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formulated cattle of similar quality sold at similar times. 
The negotiated weighted average price can be compared to similar classes of slaughter 
animals purchased on a formulated or forward contract basis.  Comparisons of weekly purchased 
cattle are shown for the second half of 2002, using weighted average prices for domestic 35-65% 
Choice steers bought on a live-weight basis (figure 1).  Included are a negotiated price from 
LM_CT154 and formulated and forward contract prices from LM_CT151.  The prices are those 
paid for cattle slaughtered during the week reported.  As such, there is a timing issue when 
comparing the prices, particularly for forward contract purchases.  Packers paid a relatively high 
price for forward contract cattle as futures tended to trade high relative to expiration during much 
of the time period.  The formula prices lag the negotiated prices, which is understandable if the 
formulas tie to observed cash prices.  There seem to be relatively large swings in the forward 
contract prices, perhaps because of thinness in this market segment.   
Two issues are apparent given the price information available.  First, it may be possible 
to extend the work of Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998).  With a long and growing time-
series of negotiated and formula prices, it would be possible to at least account for seasonal 
patterns and large market shifts.  The second issue is that of packer margins.  It is not clear what 
final price, across all purchases, packers are paying over time.  As long as cost is obscured, 
feeders will not know the margin on which to negotiate.  The cost is probably more of an issue 
for swine, but more transparent also. 
A useful and informative swine report was not released consistently until after the “3/60” 
guideline change.  The prior day slaughtered swine report gives final prices paid for swine under 
the different purchase arrangements.  Reported are the daily head count and average net price for 
  6the following purchasing categories: negotiated, other market formula, swine or pork market 
formula, other purchase arrangement, and packer sold.  A head count and slaughter 
characteristics are given for packer owned hogs, but a price is not applicable for the category.  A 
total weighted average price is also given for the categories where producers sell to packers.  
This price is probably the most transparent indicator of packer costs. 
 
Supply Situation 
AMS reports supply information that was not available before mandatory reporting.  The 
committed and delivered cattle reports give summaries of cattle classified by purchase type and 
by cattle type (steer, heifer, etc.).  Specifically, cattle to be delivered within the next seven days 
are considered committed.  If a large amount of cattle were reported as committed for a 
particular day, then one would know that these cattle would be delivered sometime in the next 
week.  This gives an indication of the short-run supply conditions relevant for price discovery 
and efficient planning or timing of feedlot sales. 
Looking at the total number committed and delivered clarifies daily patterns of 
purchasing behavior in the industry.  Packers purchase a large number of cattle on a given day of 
the week, then take delivery of a smoothed out number of head on a daily basis.  There are 
typically spikes in the daily committed level and little variability in the daily delivered level 
(figure 2).  Because of the difficulty of pinpointing specific cattle committed to the exact day 
they are delivered, running totals are necessary to see how committed and delivered levels 
correspond to each other. 
Because AMS reports say committed cattle are “generally for slaughter in 7 days”, a five-
calendar-day tally is used to give a running total of committed and delivered cattle.  The 5-day 
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committed total indicates whether or not packers are “short bought”, meaning that a small 5-day 
committed total implies packers need cattle to maintain slaughter plant efficiency and may be 
willing to pay higher prices to achieve such efficiency.  Such times would show as valleys where 
the 5-day committed total is below the 5-day delivered total (figure 2).  AMS currently reports 
week-to-date totals in a morning review report, LM_CT130. 
For comparison purposes, consider another aspect of the swine slaughtered report - the 
number of swine scheduled for delivery to packing plants.  Each day the number scheduled for 
the following two weeks is reported.  The average number of head scheduled declines as one 
looks ahead through the week.  The information should allow producers to gauge the short-run 
supply situation of packers.  If packers are “short-bought” they may be more likely to bid up cash 
purchases.  If packers have a relatively large number of hogs already arranged for slaughter, they 
may offer lower bids. 
To demonstrate how to use the information, the number of head scheduled for delivery 
during the next two weeks was computed on Fridays during the first quarter of 2003 (figure 3).  
The number scheduled each week is compared to the number scheduled from a year earlier.  
During the first six weeks of 2003 packers had more swine scheduled than during 2002, i.e., they 
had ample supplies ready for slaughter.  One would not have expected sharp increases in cash 
prices following those weeks.  Had the levels been below the 2002 amounts, producers could 
have used the information and waited for improved bids. 
Returning to the cattle reports, another piece of data that may be useful is the breakdown 
of the committed and delivered cattle from each state.  Such a breakdown might prove insightful 
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improve projections of cattle-on-feed statistics, similar to Norwood and Schroeder (2000). 
The weekly packer owned cattle report, LM_CT153, has slaughter volume and 
characteristics for cattle owned by packers, but no prices.  It also gives slaughter volume for 
cattle slaughtered that were purchased the previous week under formulas and forward contracts.  
In addition, it gives forward contract data by month that includes a head count and the observed 
range of basis levels.  AMS has refined this report by adding the year of the contract month and a 
cumulative total contracted for each month.  The forward contract volume data itself is not new.  
AMS used to report a running total of contracted volume in the “Forward Contract Slaughter 
Cattle” report.  By gathering the amount and month of cattle forward contracted it would be 
possible to gauge medium-run supply conditions. 
Using the weekly average closing of the CME futures price with the reported basis levels, 
it may be possible to infer the forward contract price at the time the contracts were entered.  Such 
prices could be matched against the eventual forward contract prices paid.  Admittedly, the low 
volume of head forward contracted may limit the usefulness of such information.  However, 
producers have conveyed that they have felt pressured to forward contract at different times of 
the year to capture good price levels that erode as soon as packers get enough cattle purchased.  
Commenting on the recent introduction of serial contracts, Diersen (2003) notes the new 
contracts should reduce basis risk associated with hedging, but will have an uncertain impact on 
forward contracting activity.  The basis bids and contracting volume observed in LM_CT153 
should allow insights into these issues and extend efforts such as those of Elam (1992) and 
Parcell, Schroeder, and Dhuyvetter (2000). 
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A political controversy indirectly related to mandatory price reporting is the effort to ban 
packer ownership of livestock, tied most recently to the 2002 farm bill.  A key issue is whether 
packers should be allowed to own livestock for more than 14 days before processing.  A 
controversy surrounding the bill was the issue of “control” (Fuez et al., 2002), where various 
contracting arrangements could have been termed “ownership”.  National reporting provides 
some information concerning the scope of packer ownership.  A closely related issue is captive 
supplies of cattle.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Grain Inspection, Packers, and 
Stockyards Administration (USDA-GIPSA) defines captive supply as cattle owned, fed, or 
procured more than 14 days prior to slaughter (GIPSA, 2002). 
The packer owned cattle report provides a weekly breakdown of the number of head 
slaughtered that were owned outright by packers and priced through forward contracts or 
formulas.  The weekly numbers were tallied for the first quarter of 2002 and compared with the 
total number of head of cattle slaughtered under federal inspection during the quarter from 
UDSA-NASS (figure 4).  Those cattle not counted in the packer owned report were classified as 
negotiated.  Negotiated sales accounted for 61 percent of the number of head slaughtered.  The 
next largest category was for formula purchased cattle at 32 percent.  Packer owned slaughter 
was 4 percent and forward contract slaughter was 3 percent. 
The packer owned percentage is consistant with the percentage of packer fed purchases 
GIPSA (2002) reports for recent years.  In addition, national cattle captive supply has amounted 
to about 20 percent of slaughter in recent years (GIPSA, 2002).  Neither category seems to be 
growing, but the latter are perhaps more relevant to watch from a market-efficiency standpoint. 
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swine, and sheep purchased in the state (SDCL, 2000).  South Dakota’s Department of 
Agriculture collected prices during the enforcement period and made them available to the 
public.  South Dakota mandatory live cattle prices were obtained from September of 1999 
through March of 2001.   
South Dakota livestock industry people have expressed concern about the common 
practice of 20-day contacts in South Dakota and the 14-day breakouts in national mandatory 
price reporting.  The South Dakota mandatory reporting data shows two distinct windows in the 
delivery dates of the cattle.  There were about 900,000 head of cattle in the South Dakota data 
set.  Of those, about 400,000 head were cows, bulls, or missing a delivery date.  Of the 500,000 
head of slaughter steers and heifers, about 400,000 had a delivery date within 7 days of the 
purchase and about 100,000 head specified delivery within 20 days of purchase.  The number of 
head under the 20-day window would be classified as captive supply, suggesting a situation in 
South Dakota similar to the national picture. 
The 20-day forward contract delivery time seems like it may be of value to both the 
packer and the producer.  The packer may desire the long window to assure an orderly supply for 
slaughter.  As such, packers may be willing to pay a premium for such cattle.  An at-the-money 
call option on a live cattle futures contact with 20 days until expiration and an implied volatility 
level of 10 percent would be valued at about $0.70/cwt.  That is, upside price protection would 
cost packers $0.70/cwt. in the options market and they might be willing to pay up to that amount 
for 20-day forward contracts. 
Similar reasoning applies to producers.  By entering into the short-term contract a 
producer protects against any drop in price over the next 20 days, and a put option would be 
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happening.  A preliminary comparison shows the average difference between the 20-day contract 
prices and cash prices is less than $0.70. 
 
Implications and Conclusions 
The livestock industry has seen mixed results from national mandatory price reporting.  
The information available surpasses the scope that was accessible to producers before national 
reporting.  At least at the national level, a comparison of prices is possible across possible 
purchasing methods.  The short-run supply situation is also more transparent. 
A variety of issues related to mandatory reporting remain unresolved.  Henderson (2003) 
has elucidated the concern of producers about accepting formula prices where the base price may 
be determined by potentially inferior cattle.  National legislation introduced in recent months has 
again addressed packer ownership bans, a requirement of a negotiated base price in formula and 
forward contracted purchases, and that a minimum percent of the weekly slaughter volume be 
purchased on the spot market. 
Packer ownership and captive supply can at least be observed and some of their real or 
perceived price impacts can be examined with the available data.  The analysis lays the 
groundwork for similar insights for other states and suggests possible trends that may evolve at 
the national level once participants learn how reporting works.  Finally, further analysis may 
suggest improvements that could be made to the price reporting laws at the national level.  Given 
the limited life span of the national law, an assessment of its performance is relevant to pursue. 
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Figure 3. Assessing Swine Scheduled for Delivery, January-March, 2003 












Figure 4. Cattle Slaughter Breakdown, October-December, 2002 
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